This report was originally published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Follow the Threat Assessments
by Joseph Cirincione and Dipali Mukhopadhyay
Thursday, July 03, 2003
Senior administration officials say they based their escalating warnings of the imminent danger posed by Iraqi weapons on official intelligence assessments. In many cases, the statements went far beyond the classified estimates now available. In other cases, such as Secretary Powell's presentation to the United Nations, they tracked closely with the CIA reports to Congress. These reports themselves, however, underwent a dramatic transformation from 2001 to 2002 after reporting essentially the same data for many years. There is little new evidence in the reports to account for this change. So what triggered the new, alarmist tone in 2002?
Every six months the intelligence community submits a report
to Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons
of mass destruction. These reports outline the activities of
foreign countries regarding weapons of mass destruction programs.
Nuclear Program
The assessments of the Iraqi nuclear program remained fairly
consistent from 1998 through 2001, followed by a dramatic jump
in 2002. From 1998 to 2001, Iraq's nuclear program was addressed
in one paragraph, if at all. Until 2000, the intelligence agencies
were concerned that Iraq continued to hide nuclear-related documents,
and probably some equipment, but made no claim that Iraq was
trying to reconstitute the program. In the first half of 2000,
the report noted explicitly "we do not have any direct evidence
that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox [December 1998]
to reconstitute its WMD programs," though analysts suspected
that this might be underway. The nuclear program merited only
two sentences, noting, "Iraq has probably continued low-level,
theoretical R&D." The report for the last half of 2000
began to talk about a "reconstituted nuclear weapons program"
and cited rallying calls from Saddam to the "Nuclear Mujahidin."
In the first half of 2001, came the first mention that "Baghdad
may be attempting to acquiring materials that could aid in reconstituting
its nuclear weapons program" (emphasis added). The first
report after September 11, however, changed this judgement to
a definitive "is attempting to acquire materials" (emphasis
added).
The January-June 2002 report, however, raised alarm at unprecedented levels rhetorically, though it provided little new evidence of increased capability. This report, which moved the nuclear program from the last program mentioned to the front of the assessment, devoted six long paragraphs to the nuclear weapons, mostly detailed narrative of Iraq's nuclear history and the IAEA inspections and dismantlement process. This report introduced the allegation of Iraqi efforts to procure tens of thousands of aluminum tubes and noted that all intelligence experts agreed that these tubes could be used for a centrifuge enrichment program, though "some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs." The Director General of the IAEA, Dr. ElBaradei later refuted this lone piece of new evidence in his March 7, 2003 presentation to the Security Council.
The 2002 intelligence report also definitively concluded:
"Iraq is working to reconstitute its nuclear program."
The tone of the report presented previously known activities
in a new light, indicating a heightened threat. The report noted
"expanding international trade provided growing access to
nuclear-related technology and materials," "foreign
nuclear expertise," "an increase in dual-use procurement
activity in recent years," and "numerous meetings between
Saddam and nuclear scientists over the past two years."
Connecting these dots in a new way, the report concluded with
a stark warning: Iraq could develop a nuclear device, with indigenously-produced
fissile material, by the last half of the decade and, with foreign-procured
fissile material, within one year.
Missile Program
The assessment of Iraq's missile program underwent a similar
jump. Seven new paragraphs painted a picture of dramatic developments
in Iraq's capabilities. The 2002 report cited new construction
at missile sites and included extensive discussion of "a
ballistic missile capability that exceeds the 150 kilometer range
limitation" imposed by the United Nations, but failed to
note that the ranges, while a violation, were only 30 kilometers
over the allowed range and, instead, linked them by implication
to a discussion of the 1991 Gulf War Scuds of 650 km-range and
pre-1991 efforts to develop 3,000 km-range missiles.
Biological Program
The intelligence reports to Congress depicted Iraq's biological
weapons program with a fairly steady rise in concern that also
jumped sharply in 2002. Until 2000, each report provided the
disclaimer that no "direct evidence" existed that demonstrated
Iraq's reconstitution of its WMD programs. Concern remained that
Iraq's disclosures with regard to its biological weapons program
left many questions unanswered. Given its knowledge base and
industrial infrastructure, Iraq could rapidly produce a significant
amount of biological agents, "if the decision [was] made
to do so." In 2001, the intelligence community expressed
its concern that Iraq might be producing biological weapons agents
and, in the latter half of the year, that mobile or covert facilities,
could be enhancing this capability. In 2002, the report definitively
concluded: "We are concerned that Iraq is again producing
BW agents," (emphasis added) but offered no additional evidence
of an improved capability or intent to produce these agents.
Chemical Program
The only program that remained essentially unchanged in the 2002
reports was the chemical weapons program. Though repeating previous
assessments that "Iraq has increased it capability to pursue
chemical warfare program" by rebuilding key portions of
its civilian chemical production infrastructure, the report did
not claim that such weapons were in production, as officials
would later claim.
Key Questions
Knight-Ridder reporters Warren Strobel and Jonathan Landay wrote
July 3 that a new internal CIA study (not yet made public) on
the agency’s assessments during this period concluded that
while the central findings that Iraq was likely pursuing WMD
programs were sound, "the status and locations of those
weapons programs were ‘harder to conclude.’" Their
investigative report notes "Bush, Vice President Cheney,
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other top officials
rarely, if ever, mentioned uncertainties about the state of Hussein’s
weapons program or the quality of U.S. intelligence when making
the case last year and this year for the invasion of Iraq."
Former CIA Deputy Director Richard Kerr, who directed the study, told Knight-Ridder that "the strongest indications" of Iraq’s continuing interest in these weapons programs "came from earlier data, before the UN inspectors left" and that many of the CIA’s conclusions were "based on knowledge acquired [before] then but salted with new information." So why did the CIA reports change so dramatically in 2002?
Absent a congressional investigation, it is impossible to know. Was it just the psychological impact of the September 11 attacks that made previous Iraqi activity now seem more ominous? Did Vice President Cheney’s visits to the CIA influence analysts to change their views? Was a new team put in charge of assessments in 2002? Did the CIA adopt a new methodology in 2002 that skewed their results? Did Vice President Cheney’s advisor "Scooter" Libby who directed the Cox Commission investigation into alleged Chinese nuclear espionage advise the analysts as to their conclusions and style? Or did Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Steve Cambone bring the methodology he created for the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission on the ballistic missile threat to bear on the new Iraq assessments?
Only a thorough congressional investigation can answer these questions and ensure that future assessments are as accurate and balanced as possible.
Recent Intelligence Reports:
"Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs"
Director of Central Intelligence
October 2002
Excerpt from "Iraq - Key WMD Facilities - An Operational
Support Study"
Defense Intelligence Agency
September 2002
Released by US Department of Defense on June 7, 2003
Status of Iraq's acquisition of WMD, from CIA's biannual "Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions" reports to Congress
January-June 2002 released April 2003
July-December 2001 released January 2003
January-June 2001 released January 2002
July-December 2000 released September 2001
January-June 2000 released February 2001
July-December 1999 released August 2000
January-June1999 released February 2000
January-June 1998 released February 1999
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